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F A C U L T Y  V I E W S
Shelby County v. Holder: Why Section 2 Matters
By Ellen D. Katz
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Editor’s Note: Professor Ellen D. Katz writes and teaches about 
election law, civil rights and remedies, and equal protection.  
She and the Voting Rights Initiative at Michigan Law filed a  
brief as amicus curiae in Shelby County v. Holder, on which  
the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments February 27.  
Here, she examines why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
bears consideration in the case, which involves a challenge  
to Section 5 of the act.
Four years ago, when the Supreme Court last considered the 
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 
Justice Kennedy questioned why “[t]he sovereignty of Alabama 
is less than the sovereign dignity of Michigan,” and why the 
government of one is “to be trusted less” than the government 
of the other. Should the Justices now strike down the statute,  
as many think they are poised to do, the reason why will likely 
be their belief that places like Alabama are no longer any 
different from places like Michigan—or, better yet, Ohio,  
where Section 5 is wholly inapplicable. Voters may confront 
difficulties in Alabama, the Justices would posit, but these 
difficulties appear no worse than those faced by voters in 
those states left unregulated by Section 5. Therefore,  
Section 5 must be invalid. Q.E.D.
Sounds plausible perhaps, but take a closer look. As an initial 
matter, it is not at all clear that the Court needs to compare 
covered and non-covered jurisdictions in order to assess the 
constitutionality of the VRA. The issue presented in Shelby 
County v. Holder is not whether the Justices think Alabama is 
worse than Ohio, or even whether Congress might permissibly 
conclude that it is. Instead, Shelby County presents a different 
question: whether Congress has the power to extend a remedial 
regime that everyone agrees it lawfully adopted based on its 
conclusion that the regime continues to do critical work in the 
places where it operates. That conclusion should not be suspect, 
much less invalid, simply because problems have since 
developed in other jurisdictions that Congress might also 
appropriately regulate.
The Justices are nevertheless likely to view a comparative 
inquiry as relevant to the question presented in Shelby County, 
and with good cause. Congress’s decision to reauthorize the 
regional provisions of the VRA rests on its belief that the  
statute remains necessary, and a comparison of covered and 
non-covered jurisdictions provides one lens through which to 
assess that decision. Thus, although Shelby County does not 
require a comparative inquiry, it invites one.
Such an inquiry, however, must take seriously Section 5’s status 
as an operational statute. The Court, to be sure, has made clear 
that Congress now needs evidence of rampant unconstitutional 
conduct in order to adopt new civil rights legislation, but Section 
5 is not new. If the problems that prompted Congress to enact 
the VRA in the first instance persisted wholly unchanged today, 
Section 5 should be discarded as ineffective. To require such 
evidence as a prerequisite to reauthorization (as opposed to 
initial enactment), therefore makes little sense. It would allow 
Section 5 to continue only if the statute had been a failure.
No one thinks the statute has been a failure. What is disputed is 
the scope of its success. Critics of the VRA claim that conditions 
have improved in places like Alabama because the problems 
Section 5 targets have been solved, and decidedly not because 
Section 5 actively shapes public conduct in covered jurisdictions 
in significant and productive ways. In other words, those who 
insist that similarities between Alabama and Ohio render 
Section 5 invalid discount and often disregard Section 5’s 
blocking and deterrent effects.
There is, however, extensive evidence showing that Section  
5 significantly shapes governance decisions in covered 
jurisdictions. Hundreds of proposed changes to election laws 
have been blocked by the Department of Justice; hundreds  
more have been withdrawn or altered in the course of Section 5 
review; and many more changes were never proposed because 
















































































Left and above: Large crowds gather outside the Supreme 
Court on the day of the Shelby County arguments.
Given these blocking and deterrent effects, we should expect  
to find fewer instances of discriminatory practices in places 
subject to Section 5 if, as critics of the VRA contend, places like 
Alabama are truly no different from places like Ohio. Covered 
jurisdictions should look markedly better than jurisdictions not 
subject to Section 5 insofar as public officials nationwide have 
comparable inclinations to engage in discriminatory practices 
and confront comparable opportunities calling for such 
judgments.
And yet, places like Alabama do not look better than places  
left unregulated by the statute. A study I did with students here 
at the University of Michigan Law School suggests that voting 
problems remain more prevalent in places covered by the Act 
than elsewhere. Our examination of claims brought under the 
core permanent provision of the VRA—known as “Section 2”—
shows that plaintiffs have been more likely to succeed and 
succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions than in non-
covered ones, and that this disparity is even more pronounced 
when Section 2 challenges were brought against local voting 
requirements and procedures. We found, moreover, that courts 
hearing Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions were more 
likely to find certain conditions linked to voting discrimination, 
including things like intentional discrimination, extreme racial 
polarization in voting, and a lack of success by minority 
candidates.
The court of appeals in Shelby County called the regional 
disparity our study identified “particularly dramatic” in light of 
Section 5’s blocking and deterrent effects. Section 2 and Section 
5, of course, are not coextensive, but a large number of electoral 
practices run afoul of both provisions. Where they do, Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement typically blocks implementation of the 
offending practice and eliminates the need for plaintiffs to 
challenge it under Section 2. Thus, although the precise effect  
of Section 5 cannot be quantified, the court of appeals was 
surely correct that it “reduc[es] the need for section 2 litigation  
in covered jurisdictions.”
But even with this “reduc[ed]” need, Section 2 plaintiffs  
have been more likely to succeed and, in fact, have succeeded 
more often in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered ones. 
Making the disparity all the more dramatic is the fact that 
covered jurisdictions are home to less than one quarter of the 
population, and, by a lopsided margin, contain far few local 
governmental units.
Our Section 2 results also suggest that intentional discrimination 
may be more pervasive in covered jurisdictions than a cursory 
comparison of covered and non-covered jurisdictions suggests. 
As the court of appeals observed, Section 2’s results tests 
“requires consideration of factors very similar to those used to 
establish discriminatory intent-based circumstantial evidence.” 
Because courts need not find intent to find a Section 2 violation 
and have an obligation to avoid resolving constitutional 
questions when they are able, some adjudicated Section 2 
violations capture conduct that is also unconstitutional even 
though the decisions do not explicitly say so.
Our Section 2 study did not examine claims that were settled  
or decided without a published decision and accordingly 
addressed only a portion of the Section 2 claims filed or decided 
since 1982. And yet, as the court of appeals found, available  
data suggest that a fuller accounting of Section 2 litigation  
would reveal an even greater disparity in successful plaintiff 
outcomes between covered and non-covered jurisdictions. 
Where, moreover, the disparity is less pronounced (as, for 
instance, it has become over time), the Section 2 data still  
attest to Section 5’s continued importance. Even a rough 
equivalence in outcomes is significant, given Section 5’s  
blocking and deterrent effects and the disparities in  
population and relative numbers of political subdivisions.
The question whether places like Alabama are really any 
different from places like Ohio is sure to occupy the Court’s 
attention in Shelby County. The answer should be pursued  
with a clear understanding of what a comparison of covered  
and non-covered jurisdictions can be expected to yield. Section 5 
is an operational statute with significant blocking and deterrent 
effects. Conditions in covered jurisdictions cannot be examined 
meaningfully or compared responsibly to those in non-covered 
regions unless these operational effects are considered. It is 
willful ignorance to do otherwise.
This article originally appeared on SCOTUSblog (Feb. 15, 2013), 
www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-why-
section-2-matters/.
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